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 Abstract 
Ask for a definition of the word public-private partnership in a room filled with people from 
different cultures, and their answers may differ remarkably. The American of the group might 
refer to privatization and contracting out of traditional government services. A Dutch person 
might think of a network of public and private actors, negotiating to deliver services in 
unison. A Hungarian may think of completely different consequences, such as opening up 
government to public actors, helping to strengthen democratic institutions. While some 
proponents of this form of market governance may present these features of public-private 
partnerships as a single package, it remains important to understand that the effectiveness and 
type of public-private partnership will vary according to culture. This has particular 
implications for the influence of PPP on sustainable development. 
This paper will examine the role of public-private partnerships in breaking down hierarchical 
structures and helping to better achieve sustainable development. It will also examine the role 
that cultural factors play when exploring the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
public-private partnerships. It will use Hungary as an example of how culture influences how 
the government interprets public-private partnerships. With its recent accession to the 
European Union and the quick transfer to a market-based economy, Hungary has been driven 
to a style of governance closely related to an American model of the welfare state, one based 
on neo-liberal principles of economic efficiency. These principles, while they may be 
effective in a country with a weak tradition of government intervention and strong business 
interests, can be less effective in a country where local industry is fragile, and there’s been a 
long tradition of some form of corporatist governance.1
Introduction 
While bureaucrats and political scientists may share some opinions on the potential 
advantages of public-private partnerships, bureaucrats tend to focus on the economic benefits, 
while academics expand their praise for these political arrangements into other areas. For 
example, a European Commission funded document on Guidelines for Successful Public-
Private Partnerships reports that alliances between the public and private sector offer a 
number of advantages: “These include the ability to raise additional finance in an 
environment of budgetary restrictions, make the best use of private sector operational 
efficiencies to reduce cost and increase quality to the public and the ability to speed up 
infrastructure development.” (European Commission, 2003) Academic proponents of public-
private partnerships accept these economic arguments, but also add benefits that relate to the 
political sphere. These benefits can include increased political participation and greater 
legitimacy for projects (Börzel & Risse, 2002; McLaughlin & Osborne, 2000; McQuaid, 
2000). One might go so far as to argue that public-private partnerships could be seen as a tool 
to try to counter declining levels of social capital. The idea of increased political participation 
has particular appeal for people concerned about the lack of a democratic tradition in 
developing countries, including those countries that joined the European Union in 2004. 
The idea that public-private partnerships can produce more than just increasingly effective 
delivery of government services has led some academics to examine whether these modes of 
governance can help to achieve sustainable development. Sustainable development, in this 
case, is based on the ideas produced in Brundtland Report of 1987, which came out of an 
effort by the United Nations to recommend ways that society could balance the needs of 
                                                 
1 This is a working paper. You can find the latest version at http://www.utwente.nl/cstm/working-papers/ppp-
culture-shock.pdf.  
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 economic development while maintaining a healthy environment. Sustainable development, 
according to the report, strives for three key objectives: innovation in social and 
environmental policy to achieve a resource-efficient economy; improvement in economic 
welfare and quality of life in developing countries; and the promotion of a healthy natural 
environment with resources used and conserved wisely. Some academics have abridged the 
concept of sustainable development into an alliteration of ideas: economics, environment, and 
equality. Not only does economic growth need to be balanced with a use of natural resources 
that won’t lead to harmful environmental degradation and hardship for future generations, but 
these goals must be accomplished within a setting that sees social equality or justice as 
important.2
The challenges involved in achieving sustainable development also coincide with doubts over 
the ability of governments to efficiently effect change through hierarchical, bureaucratic 
decision making. One common image of bureaucracies depicts an organization slow to adapt 
to changing situations. Those who accept this image often use it to belittle bureaucracies, but 
hierarchies are designed with organizational stability in mind. As some sociologists argue, 
hierarchical organizations are meant to enforce cohesion with a strong focus on structure and 
order. According to Michel Schwarz and Michael Thompson, hierarchies achieve this 
cohesion through “ritualism and sacrifice” as transactions funnel through their proper 
channels and members of the organization are taught to know their positions within the 
hierarchy. (1990) Of course, hierarchical organizations can display innovation and intelligent 
behaviour. The real issue for academics is whether a purely hierarchical organization can 
respond to rapidly changing situations, which seems to be an increasing norm as the 
information age continues to advance and accelerate. Hierarchical organizations have little 
time to reinvent themselves according to new demands and scenarios. One might consider the 
current difficulties of U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies as an example of this, as critics 
have claimed they were unable to shift quickly enough from a Cold War mentality. Of 
course, organizations are more than just a series of rules, and the people within those 
organizations often find ways to circumvent formal structures that are designed to maintain 
order. (Bowditch & Buono, 2001) But ultimately, while an informal culture may give a 
hierarchical organization some flexibility, these actions run contrary to the organization’s 
formal culture, and rather than suggesting dynamism and an ability to rapidly change, these 
conflicts can lead to difficulty and dysfunction over the long term. In a time of dynamic 
change further accelerated by the advancement of the information age, organizations need to 
focus on flexibility. Given hierarchy’s penchant for procedure, then, these hierarchical types 
of organization seem less capable of coping with complex conditions. (Noordegraaf, 2003) 
Researchers don’t need to look far to find examples of bureaucracies attempting to stay ahead 
of scientific change. While the polis has been unable to determine the moral implications of 
genetically-modified organisms and stem-cell research, science presses on in the absence of 
political consensus. Scientific change seems to outpace the ability of bureaucracies to 
regulate its growth so as to minimize any negative impacts on society. 
                                                 
2 Defining social equality, of course, is an extremely difficult task. Douglas Rae (1981), for example, 
systematically defines the term and finds at least 108 ways in which one could measure equality. Some of the 
factors that one could use to measure equality include individual vs. group equality, relative vs. absolute 
equality, and means-regarding vs. prospect-regarding equality opportunity. H. Peyton Young (1995) identifies 
three philosophical bases from which the term has been defined and used in real-world situations: Aristotelian 
equality, which asserts that benefits should be divided equally; egalitarian equality, which believes that goods 
should be divided in a way that maximizes the total benefit to all claimants; and Rawlsian equality, in which the 
least well-off group in society should be made as well off as possible. All three forms find practical expression 
in society. 
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 The great irony is that while we may have accumulated an astounding amount of knowledge 
about society—through both the physical and social sciences—which should help us to better 
understand the world around us, this knowledge has become so complex that some believe 
we are unable to completely control it. Not only is this complexity caused by the increased 
speed of innovation, but also by what Anthony Giddens calls the reflexivity of modernity. 
While social scientists learn more about society, this knowledge is then cycled back into 
society, hence changing it: “The development of sociological knowledge is parasitical upon 
lay agents’ concepts; … notions coined in the meta-languages of the social sciences routinely 
reenter the universe of actions they were initially formulated to describe or account for.” 
(Giddens, 1990, p. 15) A simplified example of this concept might be the use of polling to 
gather public opinions. Polls are meant to take a snapshot of how people feel at a particular 
time; yet, publishing those polls via the media also ends up changing people’s opinions about 
society (which then requires more polling). Giddens’ suggestion is that ideas in sociology, 
economics, and political science feed into society via its influence on bureaucratic institutions 
and leaders in other fields. This information makes its way to the media and then on to 
society. This “feed-in” ends up changing society, making old theories and existing knowledge 
obsolete. Each new advance in information technology has only worked to increase this pace 
of change and the speed of this cycle. The age of modernity, Giddens claims, has reached a 
radical stage. Hierarchies are not only less able to deal with the pace of change, but society 
itself has been rejecting historicity (“the use of knowledge about the past as a means of 
breaking with it”) and tradition more than ever before. (p. 50) We are oriented to a future, and 
our hierarchies—designed to create stability—are becoming less effective. 
Given the fact that hierarchical organizations are designed to promote stability in a relatively 
static world, and given the problem of reflexivity, it seems clear why governments and 
academics have sought other modes of organization.3 The solution for some is the dynamism 
of markets. For this reason, policy analysts have tried to combine the benefits of the public 
and private sectors in various models of market governance—quasi-markets, privatization, 
and public-private partnerships. Relationships that involve the dynamism of markets without 
completely rejecting the guidance of a hierarchy, some academics claim, may be better able 
to compensate for the increased dynamism in society, and hence may also be better able to 
achieve sustainable development. The assumptions behind fully functioning markets, as 
espoused by neo-liberal thinkers, are well-known. Healthy competition compels firms to offer 
similar goods and services at the lowest possible price. Such thinking underplays some of the 
arguments that support public-private partnerships. Markets are inherently more price 
efficient than government bureaucracies, so valuable public services can be delivered at a 
lower cost through the private sector, and opening government to private forces can also 
discipline government departments. Yet, even these thinkers acknowledge that the state has 
some role to play, if only to correct the “failures” of markets, such as their inability to react in 
the long term or the tendency towards monopoly. The growing consensus around the price 
efficiency associated with markets holds obvious appeal to governments faced with budget 
shortfalls. In a way, governments want to have it all—they want to be able to harness the 
economic efficiencies found in the marketplace while at the same time holding on to the same 
political levers that are the mainstay of the welfare state, such as income redistribution and 
various social programs. 
                                                 
3 Of course, not all academics accept the futility of bureaucracy and hierarchy argument. Some great 
achievements in environmental policy have derived from government regulation and hierarchical decision 
making, such as banning leaded gasoline from motor vehicles. (Golub, 1998) For an interesting piece on the 
successes and failures of markets, see Robert Kuttner’s Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets. 
(1996) 
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 This paper works from the assumption that dissolving large hierarchies can lead to greater 
dynamism, which seems a necessarily step toward the goal of sustainable development. 
However, different types of public-private partnerships will lead to differing visions of the 
functions of government and bureaucracy, which will influence the question of whether 
public-private partnerships help or hinder sustainable development. Undoubtedly, delivering 
the same services at a better price cannot hurt sustainability; however, the question remains 
whether public-private partnerships have any influence on the remaining two elements of 
sustainable development—the environment and equality. The purpose of this paper is two-
fold. First, it aims to show that certain types of public-private partnerships have greater 
potential to assist in achieving more dynamic government and sustainable development. 
Second, this paper intends to explore whether cultural and institutional settings—or a 
particular regime type—will lead to different policy preferences and, by extension, different 
forms of public-private partnerships. Certainly, the reasons for adopting public-private 
partnerships vary by jurisdiction, and even looking at these justifications can help to indicate 
whether public-private partnerships will be useful as a tool for sustainable development. To 
exemplify these questions, this paper will briefly explore how the national government of 
Hungary has chosen to implement public-private partnerships and will show that their 
implementation has little to do with dissolving hierarchies or changing the way government 
operates, but more to do with political expediency. 
Refining Culture for Analyses 
Policy makers and academics may feel uncomfortable with the notion of culture because they 
believe concepts like “culture” and “history” are too vague for proper social-scientific 
analysis. Culture, after all, is not a quantifiable and measurable category. (Wegener, 2000) 
However, even if one uses qualitative methods of analysis to identify cultures, a number of 
concerns still appear. First is how to deal with a singular “culture” in a multi-cultural world, 
or even how to deal with regions within a particular country. Certainly, few would argue that 
policy development in Alberta, Canada, a fiscally and socially conservative region of the 
country, is similar to that in Québec, Canada, a much more liberal region. As well, as cultural 
theorists Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky, and Richard Ellis argue, “The tendency to 
attach culture to nations persists despite strong evidence suggesting that variation in political 
attitudes and values within countries are often greater than those between countries.” In other 
words, a conservative living in France will have more in common with a conservative 
German than with a French Marxist. (1990) Yet, these critiques are manageable if one 
accepts that qualitative and quantitative data must be combined for a proper analysis of the 
subject. As well, one must also accept that while the concept of a single culture remains 
difficult to assess in a multi-cultural world, one can still analyze an aggregate of cultures 
within a nation to speak of its character, at least in reference to policy making (and a nation 
can refer to a country or a region). Furthermore, while society may be fluid, the institutions 
that guide those cultures are less fluid (as discussed previously), and therefore, more easily 
analyzed through this cultural lens. 
Culture is an important unit of analysis because it guides policy preferences for various 
institutions. If a particular policy runs counter to the cultural values of an organization, then it 
may either implement the policy incorrectly or may resist it to such a degree that the policy 
ends up failing. Resistance to these policies can run both inside the organization attempting to 
implement it, and also in society at large. Cultural values lead to certain assumptions that 
governing institutions use when developing legal and political frameworks. For example, 
Dave Huitema, in a comparison of Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK in issues of siting 
hazardous waste, argues that the UK government prefers unregulated research science and 
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 avoids overburdening industry while the Canadian and Dutch governments show a greater 
willingness to regulate science and to intervene in the economy. This leads to the UK creating 
policies which place the burden of proof for denying certain licenses on the government, 
while in the Netherlands and Canada, the burden is on the applicant to prove that they 
deserve a license. (Huitema, 2002) 
One of the most useful theoretical bodies for analysing culture in a policy preference 
perspective is the literature on regime types. The idea of regime types, re-popularized by 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s famous work The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, argues that 
countries policy preferences cluster around different arrangements of the three pillars of the 
welfare state: the state, the market, and the family. (1990) Each of these institutions within 
the welfare state supports individuals during times of need. Take the example of people who 
retire. Each of these three institutions may support individuals during this time, as they are no 
longer producing income to support themselves. State-sponsored pensions are, of course, well 
known in Western welfare states; however, private-sector pensions also exist. In Canada, for 
example, the government attempts to promote private-sector pensions by allowing people to 
deposit a percentage of income into a private retirement fund (an RRSP—a registered 
retirement savings plan) without paying taxes on that income. Where state and private-sector 
pensions fail, families represent another level of support for the aged, as parents can rely on 
their children for some support. In Western welfare states, none of these pillars exists in 
isolation; however, one tends to receive emphasis over the other two. 
Esping-Andersen groups welfare-state development into three regime-types: liberal (market 
biased), corporatist-statist (family biased), and social democratic (state biased). The first, 
identified by Anglo-Saxon countries like Britain, the United States, and Canada, derives from 
a liberal tradition of laissez-faire. One feature of these states is that they tend to emphasize 
labour as a commodity. In other words, a person’s survival is contingent on the sale of their 
labour. These regimes also emphasize class differences, as these states tend to institute 
means-based social welfare schemes that stigmatise those collecting social assistance. The 
second regime, as exemplified by Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, represents states that 
aim to maintain old class differences, and in which the development of the welfare state very 
much relied on the idea of noblesse oblige. These regimes, Esping-Andersen argues, were on 
the vanguard of creating the welfare state, as they were interested in using these schemes to 
maintain the traditional order of society. In fact, Otto van Bismarck—the first Chancellor of a 
newly unified Germany in 1871—was the first to implement a pension scheme for the 
working classes in the 1890s. The third regime, most often seen in the Scandinavian 
countries, represents those areas most heavily influenced by the urban labour movement and 
various other groups (as demonstrated in the “red-green coalitions” of Norway and Sweden, 
as labourers joined with small, capital-intensive family farmers to further their interests at the 
turn of the 20th century). These states, according to Esping-Andersen, are the most likely to 
have low levels of labour commodification as well as the least amount of social stratification. 
Benefits are high and social equality is considered an important political goal. 
Regime types are important because they influence policy preferences and work as one 
indicator of whether a particular policy action will succeed. Particular regimes will be more 
likely to accept policy action depending on their fit with existing cultural and institutional 
values. Researchers Robert Goodin, Bruce Headey, Audun Ruud, and Henk-Jan Dirven have 
done significant empirical work in the field of regime types to find a connection between 
regime types and policy preferences as outlined by Esping-Andersen. (Goodin, Headey, 
Ruud, & Dirven, 1999) Morten Blekesaune and Jill Quadagno, in their own attempt to test the 
idea of regime types, found a strong correlation between egalitarian, socio-democratic nations 
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 and less resistance (both from institutions and the general population) to redistributive efforts. 
They found that national differences between attitudes to welfare state policies clearly 
differed between the three regime types. In an analysis of redistributive policies for 
unemployment, retirement, and health care, they argue that “Egalitarian [social democratic] 
nations have more positive public attitudes toward active welfare state policies toward the 
unemployed, but not for the sick and the old.” (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) The 
researchers found this division significant, though not surprising. One would expect, they 
argue, that self-interest appears when talking about sickness and age (from which no one 
reasonable expects to escape), so differences between regime types on this issue should be 
low. Unemployment, they argue, best reflects the ideological preferences of various nations 
because it reflects less on self-interest. 
Given differences in policy preferences, it’s interesting to see how regimes from one type 
take reforms from nations of another type and rework them to their institutional and cultural 
setting. Henrik Bang, in an examination of culture governance, demonstrates how the Danish 
government adopted American-style reforms under the rubric of New Public Management, 
but adapted the policy’s intent to their situation. Generally, New Public Management 
involves flattening the differences between public and private sector organizations and 
reducing the discretionary power of upper-level managers, especially over staff, contracts, 
and money. (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994) Given the neo-liberal economic values entrenched in 
the United States, it remains logical that these ideas would derive from North America. 
Private-sector institutions are seen as inherently superior, and government bureaucracies are 
viewed with distrust. These American-style reforms not only attempt to bring private-sector 
values to the public-sector, they also attempt to bring government decision-making closer to 
the “ground,” with decisions made at lower levels of the hierarchy, which in theory, should 
mean government being more responsive to local needs. Yet, when adapting these reforms to 
social-democratic-inspired nations like Denmark, some aspects of these reforms were simply 
ignored: 
However, when NPM’s mantra often functions in a Danish context, … it is not primarily due to 
the kind of depoliticization of administrators and citizens in the ‘boutique Denmark’ which 
seems so dear to party politicians acting from a hierarchical and rational goal model. On the 
contrary, it is because both the administration and the users have recognized that creating the 
desired results requires that they expand self-governance and enter into partnerships, providing 
for the very kind of wholeness and coherence that their politicians strive for but cannot obtain 
directly by their abstract models of hierarchy and rational goal attainment (Bang, 2004, p. 168). 
Rather than trying to satisfy the citizen by making government more like industry—turning 
citizens into consumers and civil servants into service providers—the Danish government has 
managed to make the bureaucracy more responsive to citizens by implementing only those 
aspects of New Public Management that moved decision-making down the chain. The goal is 
not to “depoliticize” bureaucracy, because the Danes do not have the same distrust of 
bureaucracy as Americans. The Danes’ implementation of New Public Management, called 
New Perspectives on the Public Service, embraces the Danes’ strong tradition of top-down 
steering and their tradition of self- and co-regulation from below. 
Fredrik von Malmborg, in a valuable study on the application of public-private partnerships 
in Sweden, not only analyzes the match between organizational cultures in the public and 
private sectors, but also looks at the importance of cultural and institutional settings. One 
important aspect of this study was that: 
[the] findings of this study add to the theories put forward by Kouwenhoven and particularly 
Benson by stressing that effective collaboration is not only dependent on the relationship 
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 between the collaborating organizations, but also on the characteristics of the organizations 
themselves and the institutional environments of each organization (e.g. rationalized myths 
among SMEs [Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises]) The latter also provides evidence for the 
assumed need for research on partnerships in different countries, if practical policy guidance is 
to be provided. (2003, p. 145, emphasis added) 
Cultural factors, in this analysis, are important in being able to predict the success or failure 
of particular projects. Of course, culture is only one factor of many, but it should not be 
ignored. 
Authors often use the idea of regime types and cultures and relate them to an idea of path 
dependency to explain policy preference. The path dependency argument basically states that 
organizations will adopt policies that most closely match their existing structures because 
they present the fewest costs (certainly in cases with increasing returns from maintaining a 
certain standard and sometimes in cases with constant returns). (Arthur, 1989) The most 
common example of path dependency offered in the literature is that of the QWERTY 
keyboard. The current keyboard that the English-speaking world uses was designed in the 
1920s in such a way as to slow down typists, lest they jam the keys on their typewriters. 
Generally, keystrokes aren’t evenly distributed between the left and right hand of the 
keyboard (on average, 60% of keystrokes occur on the left side of the keyboard), and some of 
the most common letters aren’t found on the home row. While some argue that the DVORAK 
layout would be a better approach, few want to invest the time to learn a new keyboard 
layout. The industry is locked into this approach, at least until the computer industry finds a 
more efficient means of entering data than a keyboard.4 (Woerdman, 2003) This idea has 
been applied to the level of bureaucracies and governments. According to Atle Midttun and 
Eirik Svindland, “this selection builds on nation-specific competencies and predispositions ... 
[and] it is conceivable that a self-reinforcing build-up of diverging path-dependent regulatory 
strategies in two countries or regions…” (2001, p. 111) The important issue to realize is not 
only the resistance that certain policies (and types of public-private partnerships, by 
extension) will encounter within particular regimes, but that the cost of implementing those 
policies may also vary by regime. 
One must be careful with the regime type and path dependency claim, however, as one can 
take the argument too far. Path dependency and regime types don’t preclude radical change. 
They simply point out that in certain scenarios, organizations will fail to choose a more 
efficient option because the costs of implementing that option are too high. In all likelihood, 
radical change most likely occurs because of an extreme event to which organizations and 
countries must adjust, or because of outside influences forcing decisions upon a country.5 
And if radical change is forced by outside organizations, the question must be asked whether 
the added costs of an imposed a solution, which do not match with a regime type, are justified 
by the benefits. 
The Role of Public-Private Partnership within a Regime 
The term public-private partnership suggests a relatively simple concept—public and private 
organizations working together in a partnership; however, the term is deceptively variable. If 
a single definition existed for public-private partnerships, researchers could examine their 
                                                 
4 Of course, even these assertions are controversial in some circles. And, of course, one must keep in mind that 
the DVORAK keyboard is optimized for those typing in the English language, so there’s little motivation for 
non-English typists to select this format. QWERTY happens to be the most easily agreed upon standard. 
5 These outside forces can include inter-governmental organizations like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, for example. 
 7
 role within particular regimes to analyze the success in implementation. Yet, the problem 
with the term is that it remains open to interpretation. Researchers in the field often identify 
five or six different types of public-private partnerships. This variability leads to many 
misunderstandings when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of public-private 
partnerships, as members of different communities usually have their specific type in mind 
when they formulate their arguments. This can also make public debate very difficult, 
because where one group may assume that public-private partnerships work as a form of 
privatization and abdication of government responsibility, a proponent may see it as a tool to 
include more actors in the public process. 
Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse identify four archetypical public-private partnerships.6 The 
first type is consultation, which the authors consider the most common and weakest form of 
partnership. One reason why this form of partnership may be the most widespread is that it’s 
the easiest to implement and also allows governments to retain existing structures. In essence, 
the government manages to expand its base of knowledge and can also gain some credibility 
within various communities through closer relationships, whether with NGOs or business. 
Other parties also receive some benefits with more access to government decision makers, so 
that they can hope to gain some influence. The second type is delegation of public goals, 
usually through some form of outsourcing. This type of public-private partnership also has 
particular appeal for governments seeking cost savings, as it gives them a more “flexible” 
work force. From one perspective, this can mean the government can more rapidly shift its 
resources from one project to another, giving it a degree of dynamism. From another 
perspective, it also allows governments to circumvent public-sector unions by contacting out 
to the lowest bidder. A few examples that the authors point to include the International 
Standardization Organization (ISO) and the Committee for European Normalization (CEN). 
The third type of public-private partnership has the most interesting implications for 
hierarchical structures and represents perhaps the most radical shift in government 
organization—joint decision-making. In this case, governments do more than just consult or 
contract out to the private sector, but actually give these groups a meaningful role in the 
decision-making process. One example of this joint decision-making process is with the 
World Commission on Dams (WCD), where negotiating mechanism reconcile the 
construction of big dams with principles of sustainable development. Organizations outside 
of the government help decide the political goals as well as make comments on economic 
feasibility. The fourth type that the authors identify is self-regulation in the shadow of 
hierarchy, where the government doesn’t so much work in partnership with other 
organizations, but works more as a referee loosely interpreting the rules of conduct. In this 
regime, governments walk quietly and carry big sticks. This self-regulation usually works 
best when a number of large, high-profile companies control an industry. A classic example 
is the chemical industry’s reaction to a massive chemical spill in Bhopal, India in 1984. In 
this incident, gas leaked from a tank of methyl isocyanate, killing approximately 3,800 people 
and injuring many others. In reaction, the major industries of the time met and drew up new 
codes of conduct. Rather than have the government regulate the problem, industry wanted to 
prove it could govern itself. (Johnston, 2004) The threat of regulation is important in this 
case. While some may point to falling stock prices as the incentive for change—and hence, 
                                                 
6 The authors actually identify five types of public-private partnerships, but their fifth, but their own admission, 
remains questionable as to whether it represents a real partnership—state adoption of privately-negotiated 
regimes. Essentially, in this case, the government legitimizes activity that has already been performed in the 
private sector, accepting it as a de facto standard for a particular activity. Registration of domain names on the 
Internet as an example, though of course, some government bodies have complained that allowing for corporate 
control over domain name registration has, in a backhanded way, given the U.S. government and corporation 
more control over the Internet, which represents more than just an economic interest and a market. 
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 the market encouraging good corporate behaviour—the reason that the chemical industry 
made these changes was because of the threat of government intervention. The organizations 
knew they had to effect real changes to their industry, otherwise the government would 
impose its own solution. 
Stephen Linder and Pauline Rosenau identify six forms of public-private partnerships, but 
rather than analyze the structure of public-private partnerships, they look at the primary 
rationale behind their use. Rather than speaking of the end result, such as “more effective 
service delivery” or “more cost-effective government”, Linder and Rosenau analyse the kinds 
of changes that policy analysts believe will occur that will lead to these objectives. Quite 
often, the rationale for change involves some kind of government restructuring, whether 
ideologically or organisationally. Each of these objectives, in fact, can coincide with three of 
the four structures outlined by Börzel and Risse—consultation, delegation, and joint decision-
making. The one rationale that coincides almost perfectly with a particular structure is the 
idea of power sharing, which needs no further explanation at this point. In regards to 
delegation, one could place the idea of risk shifting and restructuring public service. Risk 
shifting generally means that government feels the private sector can assume some of the 
financial risks of a project in exchange for profits (some argue that businesses, with 
specialized knowledge in a field, can adopt a project at a lower cost, so the risk transference 
ends up costing the government very little; others disagree). Public-service restructuring 
generally involves contracting out services and giving government more “flexibility” with its 
workforce (as discussed earlier). Finally, in regards to consultation, one could categorize 
management reform, problem conversion, and moral regeneration. Essentially, these 
three rationales involve changing the way bureaucracies approach particular problems. 
Whether it means an ideological change (the use of more market-based principles of 
management, as implied in New Public Management) or refocusing on new types of 
problems, the fundamental structure of bureaucracies remain relatively consistent. (Linder 
and Rosenau, 2002) Interestingly, the structure of self-regulation does not appear to fit easily 
within any of the goals. One could argue that the goal of self-regulation involves the 
elimination of government. Yet, as has been pointed our earlier, effective self-regulation still 
requires the threat of government. Clearly, dissolving all government’s ability to oversee an 
industry remains unrealistic to all except the most ideologically strident. The government 
must remain at least a silent partner in this form of public-private partnership. 
When analyzing public-private partnerships from the perspective of hierarchical decision 
making, one can place these definitions onto a continuum. On one side of the spectrum lies 
pure market governance, where governments play a minimal role in directing the economy, 
stepping in only when markets fail. On the other end of the spectrum lies purely hierarchical 
government, where decisions in a particular field are completed within the bureaucracy and 
those decisions are implemented by providing government services. The distinctions are 
important, because if one assumes that sustainable development requires the dismantling of 
hierarchical structures, then clearly those public-private partnerships on the right side of the 
scale seem less adequate. 
Markets Hierarchy 
Self-Regulation Joint Decision Making Consultation Delegation 
- Management reform - Smaller government -  Risk shifting - Power sharing 
 - Problem conversion -  Public service 
restructuring 
 
- Moral regeneration  
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 The final point is that while one might define a public-private partnership by selecting a point 
on this continuum, some public-private partnerships can involve more than one form and 
goal. 
Those forms of public-private partnerships that include market elements from this continuum, 
then, represent more fundamental transformations of government, and may also be better able 
to meet the challenges of sustainable development. However, this should not imply that those 
solutions which look primarily at markets represent a better solution. Purely market-based 
governance also presents its own problems for sustainable development. Some academics 
have attempted to argue that industry, through concepts like corporate social responsibility 
and self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy, can adjust to assume some of the 
responsibilities entailed in sustainable development. For example, environmental and social 
reporting have appeared in some corporate reports, and some countries have begun to push 
corporations in this direction. Norway, for example, introduced corporate environmental 
reporting as part of its financial reporting in 1998, which is supposed to increase awareness 
about environmental concerns and also increase market pressures on companies to change 
their practices. (Ruud, Forthcoming) In this vision of government, the main goal is for 
government to enforce particular standards of transparency so that investors and consumers 
can make informed decisions. Yet, while transparency is an important and admirable goal, it 
also seems difficult to reconcile corporate ethics with environmental and social goals. As 
Lucas Bergkamp has argued “Sharing responsibilities, by definition, results in confusing and 
diluting responsibilities and the corresponding procedures. Once corporations have accepted 
responsibilities for the public good, the government has a legitimate reason to intervene in 
corporate decision making if corporations do not discharge those responsibilities adequately. 
Consequently, in the end, corporations will be managed by state bureaucracies or by stake-
holder committees.” (2002) By definition, Berkamp argues, the goal of the corporation is to 
make a profit. While it may use tools like corporate social responsibility as a method of 
competing with other firms, one should not expect a systematic use of corporate goodwill to 
have a significant impact on social and environmental problems. Henry Mintzberg, a 
management expert at the McGill University, also maintains that a proper distinction exists 
between public and private realms. For Mintzberg, the problem is multi-fold. First, no matter 
how much information is supplied to the consumer, they never have the same amount of 
information as the seller. Beyond these difficulties of incomplete information, three 
assumptions of business management “collapse” under the assumptions of government: that 
particular activities can be isolated from one another and from direct authority, that 
performance can be fully and properly evaluated by objective measures, and that activities 
can be entrusted to autonomous professional managers held responsible for performance. 
(1996) In essence, what both these authors (and others) are pointing out is that a fundamental 
difference exists between certain public and private responsibilities. Certainly, in some cases, 
one might question whether a particular service belongs in one camp or another, but a 
difference still exists. While forms of self-governance can play a role in some strict cases, 
relegating governments to a role of policing transparency and making threats to markets can 
lead to failures in public policy. 
This leaves public-private partnerships that fall in between market and hierarchical 
governance. Certainly, from a sustainable development perspective, the idea of joint decision 
making holds some appeal. Many pluralist theorists believe that increased participation by 
various groups is the only method by which better decisions will be made. A series of authors 
have argued that “participatory democracy” results in either more just or more equal 
decisions, one of the fundamental aspects of sustainable development. (Barber, 1984; Dahl, 
1989; Hunold & Young, 1998; Schlosberg, 1999) Essentially, the argument is that the 
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 involvement of various groups in the decision-making process is the only way to ensure the 
greatest degree of transparency in government, as groups consistently challenge each other’s 
views and force information into the public arena. This form of participatory democracy need 
not involve special-interest groups, a form of pluralism long since dismissed by proponents of 
participatory democracy. As David Schlosberg argues, participation can be built upon 
networks of groups working with each other to pressure government decision-making bodies. 
Not only do these groups pressure governments, but they also form relationships to solve 
local problems: “New networks build not only on community relationships, but also on the 
relations established by past networks. At the base of networks are not simply shared 
interests, but more broadly shared experiences. Their origins demonstrate a politics of 
relations rather than a politics of isolated bodies of interest.” (p.115) Networks appear and 
dissolve as required (think of an alliance of groups determined to save a particular wildlife 
habitat, with members that would disagree on other issues, but can agree on this one—such as 
between Ducks Unlimited, a hunting society, and the Audubon Society, a bird-watching 
society, both fighting to save a particular area). Of course, not all theorists believe that 
increasing the number of partners in decision making leads to better decisions. An increased 
number of partners, some of which may have different goals and different approaches to a 
problem, may lead to a lack of clear aims and goals (leading to conflicting goals and hidden 
agendas). Unequal power between various partners may also lead to questions of collusion 
between powerful industrial groups and government to the exclusion of NGOs. (McQuaid, 
2000) Nonetheless, if thinkers wish to speak of a real shift to a new mode of governance 
without an abrogation of responsibility to the market, then those partnerships that involve 
both markets and hierarchies seem best able to achieve change. 
The question, however, is not only whether one of these arrangements represents the “better” 
structure or goal of public-private partnerships, but also how a particular structure of public-
private partnership will fit within a particular cultural and institutional setting. One could 
argue, for example, that socio-democratic nations are more likely to discuss solutions along 
the middle of the spectrum, while liberal ones will look to the two extremes. Certainly, within 
academic circles, one finds a rather stark contrast between the United States and mainland 
Western Europe in academic discussions of market governance. For an American audience, 
for example, public-private partnerships tend to represent those on either end of the 
continuum, with either privatization as represented by self-regulation or delegation 
representing the main part of the dialogue. In European circles, however, while delegation 
still represents a tool for government policy makers, academics focus more on a new 
relationship between government and private actors developed with either joint decision 
making or consultation. According to H. George Frederickson, the dominant meaning for 
governance in the United States is about privatization, risk taking, and steering, while in 
Europe, the meaning is “narrower”, referring to alliances, networks, and systems of shared 
authority. (Frederickson, 2003) 
Hungary’s Historical Schisms 
Breaking down hierarchies and introducing more dynamic market governance in the 
Hungarian context has many theoretical advantages, especially in a context where many 
believe the economy has been burdened by Soviet-style bureaucracy. The common 
assumption among some is that the pro-Soviet governments from 1947 until 1989, built on 
heavy state intervention, led to an inefficient economy. While the economy may have grown 
during the 1960s and 1970s, this growth occurred at a cost of high debt and a weak economic 
base. By the early 1980s, the Hungarian government had to abandon its stated goal of full 
employment and cut many price subsidies. (Pittaway, 2003) Public-private partnerships, 
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 within this context, seem ideal. From one perspective, economic thinkers would like to cut 
the size of the Hungarian bureaucracy to increase economic efficiency. Ceding 
responsibilities to the private sector would seem to accomplish this. From another 
perspective, an increased number of actors could also lead to an increase in the number of 
players in governing, hence increasing dialogue in a region where democracy could be 
considered weak. However, while public-private partnerships may seem to assist both of 
these issues in theory; an examination of reality shows that the first remains in question and 
the second is not occurring at all—at least in public-private partnerships recognized by the 
national government.7 In many ways, the reasons for these failures have to do with the 
cultural and institutional settings in Hungary, and the fact that many of these policies are 
imposed or inspired by Western regimes not wholly aware or concerned with local nuances. 
Countries in Eastern Europe, unlike established regimes in North America and Western 
Europe, have less leeway to follow their policy preferences, and this is primarily due to the 
financial difficulties faced by these countries. In the transition to the European Union, for 
instance, Hungary found itself with the highest per capita debt load in the world, with 
external debts of around US$16 billion, representing around 50% of GDP. Most of these 
debts were owed to private banks around the world, giving the Hungarian government very 
little leeway, as they could not negotiate with other governments to have these loans forgiven. 
The government of the time also felt that they could not afford to default on their loans, as 
this would have meant a poor credit rating, which would have made accumulating capital to 
rebuild the country prohibitive. This meant that the Hungarian government would need to 
enlist the support of two major international organizations: the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Hanley, King, & János, 2002) 
According to Hanely, King, and János, “Taking advantage of this structural dependence, 
international agencies progressively forced government officials to conform to a neoliberal 
model of the state that ruled out reliance on the traditional modes of intervention into 
economic processes and, more specifically, eliminated barriers to FDI [Foreign Direct 
Investment] in key sectors of the Hungarian economy.” 
This quest for standardization without concern for local nuances extends beyond financial 
policy, as the European Union has demanded that Eastern European countries harmonize 
their policies to Union standards. Sándor Kerekes and Károly Kiss, in a discussion of the 
quest to harmonize environmental policies, demonstrates how regulations designed to deal 
with Western European style pollution problems end up distributing funds in areas where 
they could be better used in other ways. They point to the city of Győr as a good example. In 
accordance with European Union directives, new water facilities were installed in the city; 
however, these new facilities proved to be highly inefficient, as the city didn’t produce 
enough wastewater for efficient operation of an activated-sludge treatment centre. The under-
use of this facility diverted funds from more critical areas and ended up creating huge losses 
with relatively little gain. (Kerekes & Kiss, 2000) 
While economic policy is often imposed by outside organizations, there’s little evidence to 
suggest that public-private partnerships are imposed on the Hungarian government. This 
doesn’t mean, however, that outside influences aren’t felt. Vera Leiner, head of the division 
for public-private partnerships with the Ministry of Economy and Transport, suggested that 
the Hungarian government’s latest policy recommendations on public-private partnerships 
are primarily inspired by the European Union guidelines as well as based on a search of the 
                                                 
7 Further study is required of alliances between NGOs, the private sector, and local governments. However, 
these arrangements are not acknowledged by the national government to be public-private partnerships. 
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 Internet for various studies on the subject (finding many studies out of the United Kingdom, 
for example). More important to look at, however, is how the political climate has influenced 
the reasons behind adopting public-private partnerships and also the structures. It’s clear from 
the limited examples of public-private partnerships in Hungary that certain structures are 
considered unacceptable from a political perspective. 
Hungarian public-private partnerships, at least those acknowledged and supported by the 
national government, can best be labelled as delegation of responsibility. The Hungarian 
government, under the direction of the Public-Private Partnership division of the Ministry of 
Economy and Transport, has requested all departments to submit proposals for individual 
projects that can be tendered to the private sector. Each government department has installed 
a single contact person who examines various projects to see if they are viable within a 
public-private partnership, and then reports to the Ministry of Economy and Transport. 
Before projects are submitted for tender to private companies, an interdepartmental 
committee—made up of the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Statistics 
Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Economy and Transport—reviews the 
project and advises parliament on whether the project should be accepted. For projects over 
HUF50 billion (approximately €200 million), parliament must approve the project; for all 
those under this amount, only government officials need to approve the project. (Leiner, 
2004) Significantly, all political decisions are made before the bid goes to tender. 
The first public-private partnership in Hungary demonstrates this style of public-private 
partnership. The Hungarian government gave the right to a private consortium to build, 
maintain, and toll two sets of 
highways—the first 45 km. of the 
M1 (from Hegyeshalom to Győr), a 
highway which stretches from the 
western Hungarian border to 
Budapest, and the M15, linking the 
M1 to the Slovakian border. 8 This 
project was set up using a 
concession structure, allowing a 
local consortium to build and make 
use of the motorway. The private 
sector was expected to recover the 
costs for road construction directly 
from the fees that would be 
collected for the use of the road. No 
government money was involved in 
the project, as the government’s role was to assume the political concerns for the project, 
such as determining the direction of the road and appropriating the necessary land. However, 
both political and economic problems developed soon after the completion of the project. 
First and foremost, the traffic forecasts for the M1 and M15 were wildly optimistic. Along 
the M1—considered by some to have been the most expensive stretch of pay highway in all 
of Europe—ran another stretch of single-lane road, highway 10. Many drivers chose to ignore 
the M1 in favour of this free stretch of road, which followed nearly the same path, but added 
approximately only 15 minutes to the trip. A parallel road along the M15 (highway 15) was 
not considered as useful; however, given the high cost of the road, drivers simply couldn’t 
                                                 
8 All maps printed in this document are copyright from Zentai László at Eötvös University at the Department of 
Cartography and Geoinformatics. 
 13
 afford to use the M15, and also spent the extra time on the parallel road. The government also 
experienced a political problem with this stretch of highway, as some drivers complained 
about the fact that those in the West seemed to be penalized with extra fees, while those 
driving the other major highways in the country only had to pay a “vignette” fee associated 
with all major Hungarian highways. Those people living along the road parallel to the M15 
also complained about the extra traffic along their roads, and while there was some attempt to 
limit trucks along this parallel route, a lack of enforcement essentially meant the problem 
went essentially unabated. In the end, the consortium that owned these two roads collapsed, 
and the government was forced to assume their ownership, bringing these roads under the 
vignette system. (Hodina, 2004) 
The M5, running south-east from Budapest to Szeged, was also built and operated under the 
concession system by a French-Austrian-Hungarian consortium registered under the name 
Alföld Koncessziós Autópálya Rt. (AKA). However, unlike the M1/M15 project (which had 
still not failed, to this point), this 
highway required state subsidies before 
private industry would be willing to take 
on the project. The Hungarian 
government offered the consortium a 
“considerable governmental 
contribution” including building permits 
and environmental clearance, land 
acquisition, existing assets (motorway 
sections and maintenance centre), new 
feeder roads, a standby type operational 
subsidy and traffic calming measures on 
parallel roads, which made the 
government’s contribution to the project 
around one-third of its total value 
(Timár, 1999). But, while the financial 
situation with the M5 was not as dire as 
with the M1/M15 project, the 
government still experienced complaints 
regarding overuse of the parallel 
highway 50, and the consortium was a
taken to court by drivers with claim
the company was not providing pr
value for the toll charged. In the end
political pressure forced the government 
to nationalize and incorporate the M5 
into the vignette system along with th
M1 and M15. 
lso 
s that 
oper 
, 
e 
igh-
Given the economic and political 
problems associated with these two h
profile projects, the Hungarian 
government now believes that public-
private partnerships using a concession 
structure are untenable. (Leiner, 2004) 
Highway construction using a public-private partnership format continues, however, with 
plans for a new 66 km stretch of highway from Dunaújváros to Szekszard, to be named the 
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 M6 (Dunaújáros is south of Budapest, as shown in the map above). Rather than letting private 
firms operate the highway, however, the government has decided to incorporate the highway 
into the current vignette structure, and will use a DBOF structure (design, build, operate, 
finance) amortized over a 22 year period. Private industry will be expected to handle the 
construction and maintenance of the road, but will receive payment from the government 
based on a point performance system. 
Why use a public-private partnership model for building these roads? Restructuring 
government does not appear to occur with public-private partnerships, as decision making 
structures have altered little beyond consulting with industry to see the viability of certain 
projects. In fact, in all national-government sanctioned public-private partnerships, NGOs—
groups that the government distrusts—are generally kept from decision making along with 
industrial groups. Certainly, some discussions occur between government and industry to see 
which projects industry may be willing to assume. The Ministry of Economy and Transport 
sets up regular conferences to have these discussions. However, all of the political decisions 
are made before industry is consulted with a proposal. The idea of economic efficiency is 
discussed in the literature published by the department, and certainly there’s some belief that 
private industry may be able to produce more economically efficient results that the 
government. However, the most significant reason for adopting public-private partnerships is 
the ability of the government to take on new projects “off the balance sheet”. Essentially, 
because private groups and the banks are asked to assume the financial responsibility for 
projects, the government can start new projects without affecting the budget. This is 
particularly important to the Hungarian government, as it wants to join the European Union’s 
common currency and must meet its 3% of GDP budget deficit figures. 
When asked about involving various groups (especially industry) in the decision-making 
process, interviewees universally expressed doubt. From another perspective, groups outside 
of industry have built up a great amount of distrust for the government, and while some have 
attempted to co-operate with the national government, the general belief is that this co-
operation is an empty gesture to meet European Union directives on participation and to try 
to gain political support by demonstrating a willingness for dialogue. Distrust amongst 
different groups is high, which leads to confrontation. For example, local NGOs like the 
Levegő Munkacsoport (the Clean Air Action Group) have used the courts to attempt to stop a 
project to expand the subway system, which they consider to be ill-conceived spending on 
public transportation that will have dubious benefits. (Lukács, 2004) The court system was 
also used by those opposed to the M1, M5, and M15 fees by groups, as mentioned earlier. 
Given the examples of public-private partnerships found in Hungary, the declining 
expenditures of the national government on redistributive programmes, and the high levels of 
conflict with governing bodies, it would appear that Hungary is moving towards an Anglo-
Saxon style of welfare state. The reasons for adopting this style of welfare state perhaps 
aren’t surprising. Outside influences have forced Hungary to adopt neo-liberal economic 
policies without considering the social safety net that used to be in place for the citizenry. 
Internal factors also influence this path, as citizen’s concerns have been ignored in the 
Communist-era regimes after the Second World War, leading to distrust and ultimately 
conflict with the government authorities. Public-private partnerships, in this context, can 
hardly be expected to bring sustainable development closer to reality. 
Conclusion 
Given this relationship between regime type and policy preference, it may be possible to line 
up particular regime types with different forms of public-private partnerships, which would 
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 give a better understanding of why particular public-private partnership succeed or fail. This 
kind of research can be particularly enlightening in regards to developing countries. In North 
American and European countries, national governments are still strong enough to influence 
policy development significantly. In fact, as discussed earlier, plenty of evidence suggests 
that governments from various regime types adopt policies from other countries, yet also 
mould them to fit with their particular form of governance. Yet, in developing countries, 
public-private partnerships and other economic edicts often fall more inline with a liberal-
regime approach to governance. This approach can not only threaten the success of a 
particular policy or partnership, but it can also have further implications for social stability, 
one important quality of sustainable development. One should not exaggerate the case, of 
course—implementing neo-liberal policies in regions without long-standing liberal-regime 
traditions does not imply social chaos (though in some cases, it certainly leads to a great deal 
of unrest). Yet, it remains an important issue to keep in mind, as one can find governments 
using whatever levers possible to soften the impact of neo-liberalism. 
In regards to sustainable development, public-private partnerships can help in cases where 
more groups are involved in the political process—this means PPPs along the middle of the 
scale between hierarchy and markets. However, it remains unclear whether certain regimes 
will adopt the types of partnerships necessary to break down hierarchies and bring about 
more dynamic government. While one may debate whether the idea of regime types too 
narrowly focuses the number of factors to analyze, the fact still remains that certain policy 
actions will be received differently in different institutional settings. Hungary, for instance, 
with its rapidly shrinking social safety net and high levels of distrust of government—along 
with the neo-liberal policies that have been imposed from the outside—has been moving 
towards an Anglo-Saxon route of governance. Pressure on government generally doesn’t 
work from below (much of the pressure on the Hungarian government to change generally 
comes from above from the European Union). To look at Hungarian public-private 
partnerships, then, they change the way government functions very little and also have little 
influence on sustainable development, as the idea of joint decision making seems 
unsustainable given the present situation. 
One must look to the type of public-private partnership as well as the fit in the regime to 
determine the viability for sustainable development. Culture, to return to the introduction of 
this paper, matters. In the words and worlds of Esping-Andersen: “In light of the diversity of 
national welfare systems, it is additionally fruitless to contemplate a single design for all 
nations every if they do face rather similar problems. Just as no EU Member State is likely to 
privatize its welfare state, neither is a radical welfare regime change likely to occur. The 
institutional framework of national welfare systems are historically ‘locked in’ and any 
realistic move towards common objectives much presume that such, if accepted, will be 
adapted to national practice.” (2002) The debate regarding the costs and benefits to public-
private partnership needs to take these cultural and institutional factors into account. 
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